
The government reopened mid-way through November after being closed all of October, marking an end to the longest government shutdown in history. The reopening is only agreed upon through the end of January, so there is continued uncertainty ahead.
While the AI market narrative continued to be questioned in November, Nvidia’s earnings showed the world that the it can continue to drive the market, at least for a little while longer. In the race for AI dominance, the US clearly has the lead, with American companies owning most of the IP and hardware building blocks. In fact, the biggest risk to the US economy is a decline in the AI wave. AI capital expenditure has contributed as much as 1% to GDP growth. Microsoft’s CEO recently noted that AI growth is starting to be limited by power availability rather than compute power. “The biggest issue we are now having is not a compute glut, it’s the power and the ability to get the builds done fast enough close to power [supplies],” says Microsoft’s CEO Satya Nadella. He goes on to add, “If you can’t do that, you may actually have a bunch of chips sitting in inventory that I can’t plug in.”
A new risk for market growth may be electricity prices. Edison Electric Institute highlighted that US utilities will invest $1.1 trillion in the next 5 years, double what was invested in the last 10 years. These investments will push electricity prices higher.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of The Daily Telegraph highlighted that China’s share of global GDP has shrunk for the fourth year in a row, slipping from 17.4% to 16.7% in 2024. He cites Mark William of Capital Economics, who argues “there is mounting evidence that [China’s] industrial policy is itself to blame.” Productivity has lagged relative to the US since Xi took power in 2012, likely the result of the party’s focus on a few key industries, which has distorted the broader economy. Meanwhile, China’s Deepseek is not far behind its American rivals and doing so with a fraction of the energy use and computing power. China has made great strides in electricity capacity and now surpasses the US electricity generation, currently doubling US capacity. China’s capacity comes with a cost advantage, as seen in the charts from Gavekal below. Electricity gives Chinese tech companies an advantage. However, US companies have an intellectual property advantage that more than offsets this dynamic, for now.
High Yield was up 0.50% overall but spent most of November in negative return territory until the week of the month. Spreads and yields immediately widened out to start the month with yields jumping ~20bps to over 7%. Yields stayed around 7% before declining in the last week to 6.71%. Spreads ended at 307 bps, tighter by 3 bps for the month, but almost 30 bps tighter than the intramonth wide. Single-Bs outperformed other rating cohorts with a 0.71% return, followed closely by BBs at 0.64%. CCCs materially underperformed with a -0.93% return. Rates helped push HY returns for the month, with 5-year treasuries down 9 bps to 3.60%. Flows for the month were negative in HY with $1.2bn in outflows. This follows $21bn of inflows in the prior 6 months.
Loans were up 0.21%, underperforming longer-duration assets. BB Loans outperformed posting a +0.48% return in the month, followed by Single-Bs up 0.20%. Like HY, CCC Loans struggled and finished down -1.84%. Yields on loans ended at 7.87%, flat sequentially, with spreads widening 11 bps to 465 bps. Even with the probabilities of a December rate cut being reduced throughout the month, the forward SOFR curve declined roughly 5bps across the curve. The average Loan price declined for the 4th month in a row. November saw a $0.26 price decline to $95.86, and $0.85 off the July high of $96.71. Loans saw some decent variability among industry returns with Aerospace up 0.94% for the month while Chemicals were down -1.40%
A large private credit manager attempted to merge two private credit portfolios during the month, resulting in a very negative reaction from investors. One is a private BDC offering the ability for investors to redeem their capital over time at NAV and the other is a publicly traded BDC that trades at a 20% discount to NAV. If the merger had been completed, it would have given the private BDC investors the ability to sell their interests, but likely at the current NAV discount of the publicly traded BDC, a 20% discount assuming it held steady post-merger. The publicly traded BDC declined 9% during this period. The Manager in this case is also a publicly traded equity, which declined in value over 11% over those handful of days in early November. The manager highlighted that the portfolios have a 98% overlap in investments. Given this negative reaction, the manager cancelled the plans to merge the two entities.
There were articles written in the month highlighting price discrepancies between funds for the same asset. We have seen a handful of these recently, but the asset highlighted in this case was a broadly syndicated loan with multiple markets. This article highlighted that one manager had this marked at 89 cents, while a few others had it marked at 60. Meanwhile, the bids for where any holder could sell the loan were around 50 cents.
Source: Barrow Hanley. Returns represent an asset-weighted composite of all Bank Loan Fixed Income portfolios or High Yield Fixed Income portfolios. Index returns are shown before transaction costs, management fees, and other expenses. Performance is expressed in U.S. currency. Net-of-fee returns are calculated us-ing a model fee. The model fee is based on a $100 million portfolio using our standard fee schedule. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Inception Date for Bank Loans is June 1, 2018. Inception Date for High Yield is January 1, 2005.
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The government reopened mid-way through November after being closed all of October, marking an end to the longest government shutdown in history. The reopening is only agreed upon through the end of January, so there is continued uncertainty ahead.
While the AI market narrative continued to be questioned in November, Nvidia’s earnings showed the world that the it can continue to drive the market, at least for a little while longer. In the race for AI dominance, the US clearly has the lead, with American companies owning most of the IP and hardware building blocks. In fact, the biggest risk to the US economy is a decline in the AI wave. AI capital expenditure has contributed as much as 1% to GDP growth. Microsoft’s CEO recently noted that AI growth is starting to be limited by power availability rather than compute power. “The biggest issue we are now having is not a compute glut, it’s the power and the ability to get the builds done fast enough close to power [supplies],” says Microsoft’s CEO Satya Nadella. He goes on to add, “If you can’t do that, you may actually have a bunch of chips sitting in inventory that I can’t plug in.”
A new risk for market growth may be electricity prices. Edison Electric Institute highlighted that US utilities will invest $1.1 trillion in the next 5 years, double what was invested in the last 10 years. These investments will push electricity prices higher.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of The Daily Telegraph highlighted that China’s share of global GDP has shrunk for the fourth year in a row, slipping from 17.4% to 16.7% in 2024. He cites Mark William of Capital Economics, who argues “there is mounting evidence that [China’s] industrial policy is itself to blame.” Productivity has lagged relative to the US since Xi took power in 2012, likely the result of the party’s focus on a few key industries, which has distorted the broader economy. Meanwhile, China’s Deepseek is not far behind its American rivals and doing so with a fraction of the energy use and computing power. China has made great strides in electricity capacity and now surpasses the US electricity generation, currently doubling US capacity. China’s capacity comes with a cost advantage, as seen in the charts from Gavekal below. Electricity gives Chinese tech companies an advantage. However, US companies have an intellectual property advantage that more than offsets this dynamic, for now.
High Yield was up 0.50% overall but spent most of November in negative return territory until the week of the month. Spreads and yields immediately widened out to start the month with yields jumping ~20bps to over 7%. Yields stayed around 7% before declining in the last week to 6.71%. Spreads ended at 307 bps, tighter by 3 bps for the month, but almost 30 bps tighter than the intramonth wide. Single-Bs outperformed other rating cohorts with a 0.71% return, followed closely by BBs at 0.64%. CCCs materially underperformed with a -0.93% return. Rates helped push HY returns for the month, with 5-year treasuries down 9 bps to 3.60%. Flows for the month were negative in HY with $1.2bn in outflows. This follows $21bn of inflows in the prior 6 months.
Loans were up 0.21%, underperforming longer-duration assets. BB Loans outperformed posting a +0.48% return in the month, followed by Single-Bs up 0.20%. Like HY, CCC Loans struggled and finished down -1.84%. Yields on loans ended at 7.87%, flat sequentially, with spreads widening 11 bps to 465 bps. Even with the probabilities of a December rate cut being reduced throughout the month, the forward SOFR curve declined roughly 5bps across the curve. The average Loan price declined for the 4th month in a row. November saw a $0.26 price decline to $95.86, and $0.85 off the July high of $96.71. Loans saw some decent variability among industry returns with Aerospace up 0.94% for the month while Chemicals were down -1.40%
A large private credit manager attempted to merge two private credit portfolios during the month, resulting in a very negative reaction from investors. One is a private BDC offering the ability for investors to redeem their capital over time at NAV and the other is a publicly traded BDC that trades at a 20% discount to NAV. If the merger had been completed, it would have given the private BDC investors the ability to sell their interests, but likely at the current NAV discount of the publicly traded BDC, a 20% discount assuming it held steady post-merger. The publicly traded BDC declined 9% during this period. The Manager in this case is also a publicly traded equity, which declined in value over 11% over those handful of days in early November. The manager highlighted that the portfolios have a 98% overlap in investments. Given this negative reaction, the manager cancelled the plans to merge the two entities.
There were articles written in the month highlighting price discrepancies between funds for the same asset. We have seen a handful of these recently, but the asset highlighted in this case was a broadly syndicated loan with multiple markets. This article highlighted that one manager had this marked at 89 cents, while a few others had it marked at 60. Meanwhile, the bids for where any holder could sell the loan were around 50 cents.
Source: Barrow Hanley. Returns represent an asset-weighted composite of all Bank Loan Fixed Income portfolios or High Yield Fixed Income portfolios. Index returns are shown before transaction costs, management fees, and other expenses. Performance is expressed in U.S. currency. Net-of-fee returns are calculated us-ing a model fee. The model fee is based on a $100 million portfolio using our standard fee schedule. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Inception Date for Bank Loans is June 1, 2018. Inception Date for High Yield is January 1, 2005.