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Barrow Hanley Credit Partners Monthly Market Update | Markets Rally Despite Rising Oil and Macro Stress

In this post:

5.15.2026
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Executive Summary

  • Markets rallied through geopolitical stress and higher oil prices, reinforcing the view that investors may be operating in a structurally different macro regime.
  • Credit spreads remained resilient despite rising rate volatility, as corporate fundamentals continued to compare favorably against sovereign balance sheet deterioration.
  • Traditional cyclical investment frameworks are being challenged by directed capital flows, persistent market concentration, and a changing global reserve system.

Market Recap

Financial markets defied the headlines in April. Despite the unresolved US-Iran war, continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, and oil prices pushing above $110 a barrel, risk assets staged a powerful rally. The S&P 500 returned 10.4%, its best month since November 2020, and closed at all-time highs. Small caps and the Russell 2000 jumped 15.3%, its best month since April 2020. Year-to-date, small caps have given investors a remarkable +13.21%, while the S&P is +5.70%.

In April, High Yield was higher by 1.70% and Loans were up 1.23%. Investment Grade credit returned 0.56%, while 10-year Treasuries declined -0.21%. Renewed inflation concerns helped push treasury rates higher. The 10-year rates increased 5bps during the month but oscillated between a low of 4.25% and a high of 4.43%. Fed funds expectations increased by a similar 4 bps for end of year expectations.

Three macro articles were particularly interesting. Each examined whether the post-WWII dollar-centric order has begun to lose its dominance. Simon White wrote a Bloomberg article titled "War Has Caused Lasting Damage to the Dollar System: Macroscope." Andrew Lees of MacroStrategy Partnership wrote "Pushing on a String – When Fiat No Longer Works". Lastly, Viktor Shvets on "Castles without Moats" in Bloomberg's Odd Lots newsletter.

Simon White highlights that valuation-adjusted dollar reserves have fallen below gold reserves for the first time in IMF reserve data. Following the 2022 freezing of Russian central bank assets, many central banks appear to have become more cautious in managing dollar reserves. Separately, the historic pattern of buying dollar weakness and selling strength has broken down, with recent declines failing to trigger meaningful reserve purchases. White suggests that the trade-recycling quid pro quo that funded the US cheaply in exchange for security guarantees can no longer be assumed, particularly as Middle Eastern exporters diversify domestically and as the US reliability as a security guarantor comes into question. Adjusted dollar reserves are down 15% from their 2014 peak. EM central bank physical gold holdings are up 15% in tons. White believes this shift is structural, not cyclical.

Andrew Lees digs into why the reserve status may be eroding. He highlights that the system it underwrites is structurally insolvent. US non-financial debt has grown $61.4 trillion since 2000 against only $21 trillion of nominal GDP. Net international investment position has collapsed from -$1.5 trillion to -$27.5 trillion. The treasury market now requires official intervention because the productive capital base needed to absorb it organically no longer exists. White's "puncture" is Lee's "pushing on a string." The seizure of Russian assets simply made explicit to foreign holders what the math already implied, marginal demand for Treasuries is no longer voluntary in the way the system requires.

Viktor Shvets ties these dynamics to portfolio construction. If the system must eventually clear, and the clearing is already underway in slow motion, then the Fujiwara Effect – the entanglement of fiscal, monetary, and geopolitical interventions – has degraded the cyclical machinery that mean-reversion framework depends on. The "weird" markets investors keep complaining about are not a sentiment problem. They are the price action of a system that no longer mean reverts because the mechanism that produced mean reversion – periodic clearing events that reset capital allocation – has been suppressed by policy. A market where winners take all and returns never broaden is the natural equilibrium of a regime in which cycles have been replaced by directed capital flows and disruptive thematic concentration.

Taken together, the three articles offer an uncomfortable but clarifying synthesis for investors. The conventional playbook of waiting for spreads to widen, multiples to compress, and cycles to turn before deploying capital is itself a bet on a regime that each author highlights may be gone. April's price action, with equities at all-time highs and oil above $100 a barrel, may not be an anomaly. It may instead be the macro regime Shvets describes and Lee diagnoses functioning as intended.

In this environment, a risk premium is being embedded into rate curves, causing heightened volatility. Meanwhile, corporate borrowers have been good stewards in aggregate and have not been the source of debt growth. Corporate debt to GDP has been declining since COVID and is flat to 2000 levels. Therefore, it should not be surprising that spreads on corporate debt remain "tight." Corporations in aggregate have been better creditors than sovereigns.

Duration carries heightened risk as directed capital flows intensify rate volatility. The 10-year treasury bond's standard deviation of daily price for the past five years has been 50 bps, compared to Investment Grade corporates with 38 bps and High Yield with 29 bps. This highlights that rates have been a source of volatility while credit has been a suppressor of overall volatility.

‍

High Yield

High Yield returned a strong +1.70% during the month, bringing year-to-date performance to +1.14%. Lower quality lead the way, with CCCs up +2.76% in the month, but still lagging year-to-date up +0.49%. BBs underperformed to benchmark, up +1.47%, due to more rate sensitivity. Year-to-date BBs are up +1.08%. Single-Bs posted a solid +1.81%, bringing their year-to-date performance to +1.43%. Industry returns were tight to the average, with Autos outperforming up +2.23%, and Cable bringing up the rear at +0.47%. Yields ended at 7.02%, down 4 2bps in April and higher by 44bps from the start of the year. Spreads ended the month at 302 bps, a decrease of 47 bps from the beginning of the month and higher by 6 bps from the start of the year. Flows helped returns, with +$5bn in April compared to -$10bn in outflows for the first quarter. HY posted the strongest month in net issuance since April 2020, with $27.4bn net issuance and $44bn gross issuance. Fundamentals remain strong, with high-yield companies beating expectations by a 2.5-to-1 margin.

‍

Loans & CLOs

Loans were up +1.23%, underperforming HY but outperforming duration assets. Single-Bs led Loans higher, with a gain of +1.32%, while BBs were up +1.00% and CCCs lagged +0.26%. Year-to-date, CCCs are underperforming, down -3.95%, while Single-Bs are up +0.90% and BBs are up +1.65%. We continue to remain underweight CCCs, which has paid off in terms of return and volatility in the past few years. Loan industries traded in a similarly tight band to high yield, with media outperforming at 2.11% and manufacturing lagging at 0.65%. Technology, the dominant story year-to-date, returned 0.68% but remained down 3.50% on the year. Loans ended April with a three-year yield of 8.56%, down 14bps in the month and up from 7.86% to start the year or 70bps higher. Three-year discount margins were 488bps, down 26bps in the month and 33bps higher than at the start of the year.

In late March, two Harvard professors, Mark Roe and Vasile Rotaru, published a paper titled "Liability Management's Limited Runway: Corporate Restructuring Today." The paper assess the current state of Liability Management Exercises or LMEs. The takeaway is that evidence shows equity owners and board of directors may face liability if they attempt to enhance their own optionality during stressed periods without materially solving excessive leverage. Their dataset of 89 coercive, non-pro-rata LMEs shows the bankruptcy-avoidance narrative does not hold up. Within one year, fewer than half of LME firms avoid both bankruptcy and re-default; within two years, only 22% avoid both. The three-year "success" rate is 7%. Prepackaged bankruptcies achieved with similar creditor support relapse far less often.

With non-pro-rata LME's, aggregate debt levels do not decline. Prepackaged bankruptcies reduce leverage by 57% compared to LMEs at 0%. Instead of debt-to-equity swaps, LMEs typically elevate large or favored creditors, leaving thin equity cushions and distorted incentives. Credit ratings stay essentially flat for two years post LME. Post LME bankruptcies, when they happen, last 2x-3x longer than non-LME prepacks because the engineered capital structure complexity and creditor infighting complicate the process. We hope that papers such as this will begin to influence corporate behavior. If boards pursue LMEs that are expected to be operationally useless but preserve sponsor option value, that could implicate fiduciary duties to maximize firm value, particularly once insolvency is established.

This is a meaningful point because Gheewalla (the 2007 Delaware Supreme Court decision) is what extends fiduciary duties to creditors when a company is actually insolvent, not merely in the "zone of insolvency." Once insolvency is established, creditors gain derivative standing to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty. The Roe/Rotaru data, 7% three-year success rate, 0% median deleveraging, 71% three-year bankruptcy rate, is exactly the kind of empirical record that makes it harder for a board to argue an LME was a good-faith effort to preserve firm value rather than sponsor option value.

‍

Returns as of April 30, 2026

BH Strategy Returns Month QTD 1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Year Since Inception
High Yield Composite Gross 2.10% 2.10% 9.81% 9.98% 5.68% 6.80% 6.66%
High Yield Composite Net 2.06% 2.06% 9.29% 9.46% 5.18% 6.29% 6.16%
Bank Loan Composite Gross 1.41% 1.41% 8.24% 9.55% 7.33% -- 6.54%
Bank Loan Composite Net 1.37% 1.37% 7.71% 9.01% 6.80% -- 6.01%
Asset Class Month QTD YTD Index
HY Return1.70%1.70%1.14%ICE BAML HY Index
HY BB Return1.47%1.47%1.08%ICE BAML BB HY Index
HY B Return1.81%1.81%1.43%ICE BAML B HY Index
HY CCC Return2.76%2.76%0.49%ICE BAML CCC HY Index
Leveraged Loan Return1.23%1.23%0.75%S&P UBS Leveraged Loan Index
LL BB Return1.00%1.00%1.65%S&P UBS Leveraged Loan BB Index
LL B Return1.32%1.32%0.90%S&P UBS Leveraged Loan B Index
LL CCC Return0.26%0.26%-3.95%S&P UBS Leveraged Loan CCC Index
HYG1.52%1.52%1.16%Ishares Iboxx High Yield
BKLN1.35%1.35%0.06%Invesco Senior Loan ETF
S&P 500 Return10.49%10.49%5.70%S&P 500
Russell 2000 Return12.21%12.21%13.21%Russell 2000 Index
10yr Beg4.32%4.32%4.17%10yr Treasury
10yr End4.37%4.37%4.37%10yr Treasury
10yr Return-0.21%-0.21%-0.31%10yr Treasury
Beg Mo Beg QTD Beg Year End of Month
HY YTW7.44%7.44%6.62%7.02%
HY BB YTW6.25%6.25%5.55%5.97%
HY B YTW7.77%7.77%6.78%7.28%
HY CCC YTW13.95%13.95%12.57%13.14%
HY STW349 bps349 bps296 bps302 bps
HY BB STW229 bps229 bps186 bps195 bps
HY B STW386 bps386 bps315 bps332 bps
HY CCC STW1004 bps1004 bps892 bps918 bps
LL YT3Y8.70%8.70%7.86%8.56%
LL BB YT3Y6.31%6.31%5.79%6.21%
LL B YT3Y8.34%8.34%7.42%8.18%
LL CCC YT3Y20.41%20.41%17.95%20.58%
LL ST3Y514 bps514 bps455 bps488 bps
LL BB ST3Y275 bps275 bps247 bps253 bps
LL B ST3Y477 bps477 bps410 bps451 bps
LL CCC ST3Y1689 bps1689 bps1471 bps1691 bps

Source: Barrow Hanley. Returns represent an asset-weighted composite of all Bank Loan Fixed Income portfolios or High Yield Fixed Income portfolios. Index returns are shown before transaction costs, management fees, and other expenses. Performance is expressed in U.S. currency. Net-of-fee returns are calculated using a model fee. The model fee is based on a $100 million portfolio using our standard fee schedule. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Inception Date for Bank Loans is June 1, 2018. Inception Date for High Yield is January 1, 2005.

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ABOUT BARROW HANLEY GLOBAL INVESTORS

Barrow Hanley is a diversified investment management firm offering value-focused investment strategies spanning global equities and fixed income. Recognized as one of the few remaining firms dedicated exclusively to value investing, Barrow Hanley enjoys a boutique culture with a singular focus to assist clients in meeting their investment objectives. Today, Barrow  Hanley has approximately 100 employees, over half of which are investment professionals managing assets for our valued clients. Barrow Hanley stewards the capital of corporate, public, multi-employer pension plans, mutual funds, endowments and foundations, and sovereign wealth funds across North America, Europe, Asia, Australia and Africa. For further information, please visit www.barrowhanley.com.

General Disclosures:

All opinions included in this report constitute Barrow Hanley's (BH) judgment as of the time of issuance of this report and are subject to change without notice. This report was prepared by Barrow Hanley with information it believes to be reliable. This report is for informational purposes only and is not intended to be an offer, solicitation, or recommendation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security, nor a recommendation of services supplied by any money management organization. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Barrow Hanley is a value-oriented investment manager, providing services to institutional clients.
Barrow Hanley Credit Partners® is a legally assumed name for the Alternative Credit investment team and investment strategies of Barrow Hanley Global Investors®, including Bank Loan Fixed Income, Collateralized Loan Obligations, and High Yield Fixed Income.
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These investment summaries are provided for informational purposes only and should not be viewed as representative of all investments by the firm. This report includes certain "forward-looking statements" including, but not limited to, BH's plans, projections, objectives, expectations, and intentions and other statements contained herein that are not historical facts as well as statements identified by words such as "expects", "anticipates", "intends", "plans", "believes", "seeks", "estimates", "projects", or words of similar meaning. Such statements and opinions contained are based on BH's current beliefs or expectations and are subject to significant uncertainties and changes in circumstances, many beyond BH's control. Actual results may differ materially from these expectations due to changes in global, political, economic, business, competitive, market, and regulatory factors. Additional information regarding the strategy is available upon request.

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Source: Bloomberg Index Services Limited. BLOOMBERG® is a trademark and service mark of Bloomberg Finance L.P. and its affiliates (collectively "Bloomberg"). Bloomberg or Bloomberg's licensors own all proprietary rights in the Bloomberg Indices. Neither Bloomberg nor Bloomberg's licensors approves or endorses this material, or guarantees the accuracy or completeness of any information herein, or makes any warranty, express or implied, as to the results to be obtained therefrom and, to the maximum extent allowed by law, neither shall have any liability or responsibility for injury or damages arising in connection therewith.
Merrill Lynch index data referenced herein is the property of ICE Data Indices, LLC, its affiliates ("ICE Data") and/or its Third Party Suppliers and has been licensed for use by Barrow Hanley Global Investors. ICE Data and its Third Party Suppliers accept no liability in connection with its use.

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Please contact us for more information.

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Barrow Hanley Global Investors
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31st Floor Dallas, TX 75201
www.barrowhanley.com

5.15.2026
Follow us:

Market Recap

Financial markets defied the headlines in April. Despite the unresolved US-Iran war, continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, and oil prices pushing above $110 a barrel, risk assets staged a powerful rally. The S&P 500 returned 10.4%, its best month since November 2020, and closed at all-time highs. Small caps and the Russell 2000 jumped 15.3%, its best month since April 2020. Year-to-date, small caps have given investors a remarkable +13.21%, while the S&P is +5.70%.

In April, High Yield was higher by 1.70% and Loans were up 1.23%. Investment Grade credit returned 0.56%, while 10-year Treasuries declined -0.21%. Renewed inflation concerns helped push treasury rates higher. The 10-year rates increased 5bps during the month but oscillated between a low of 4.25% and a high of 4.43%. Fed funds expectations increased by a similar 4 bps for end of year expectations.

Three macro articles were particularly interesting. Each examined whether the post-WWII dollar-centric order has begun to lose its dominance. Simon White wrote a Bloomberg article titled "War Has Caused Lasting Damage to the Dollar System: Macroscope." Andrew Lees of MacroStrategy Partnership wrote "Pushing on a String – When Fiat No Longer Works". Lastly, Viktor Shvets on "Castles without Moats" in Bloomberg's Odd Lots newsletter.

Simon White highlights that valuation-adjusted dollar reserves have fallen below gold reserves for the first time in IMF reserve data. Following the 2022 freezing of Russian central bank assets, many central banks appear to have become more cautious in managing dollar reserves. Separately, the historic pattern of buying dollar weakness and selling strength has broken down, with recent declines failing to trigger meaningful reserve purchases. White suggests that the trade-recycling quid pro quo that funded the US cheaply in exchange for security guarantees can no longer be assumed, particularly as Middle Eastern exporters diversify domestically and as the US reliability as a security guarantor comes into question. Adjusted dollar reserves are down 15% from their 2014 peak. EM central bank physical gold holdings are up 15% in tons. White believes this shift is structural, not cyclical.

Andrew Lees digs into why the reserve status may be eroding. He highlights that the system it underwrites is structurally insolvent. US non-financial debt has grown $61.4 trillion since 2000 against only $21 trillion of nominal GDP. Net international investment position has collapsed from -$1.5 trillion to -$27.5 trillion. The treasury market now requires official intervention because the productive capital base needed to absorb it organically no longer exists. White's "puncture" is Lee's "pushing on a string." The seizure of Russian assets simply made explicit to foreign holders what the math already implied, marginal demand for Treasuries is no longer voluntary in the way the system requires.

Viktor Shvets ties these dynamics to portfolio construction. If the system must eventually clear, and the clearing is already underway in slow motion, then the Fujiwara Effect – the entanglement of fiscal, monetary, and geopolitical interventions – has degraded the cyclical machinery that mean-reversion framework depends on. The "weird" markets investors keep complaining about are not a sentiment problem. They are the price action of a system that no longer mean reverts because the mechanism that produced mean reversion – periodic clearing events that reset capital allocation – has been suppressed by policy. A market where winners take all and returns never broaden is the natural equilibrium of a regime in which cycles have been replaced by directed capital flows and disruptive thematic concentration.

Taken together, the three articles offer an uncomfortable but clarifying synthesis for investors. The conventional playbook of waiting for spreads to widen, multiples to compress, and cycles to turn before deploying capital is itself a bet on a regime that each author highlights may be gone. April's price action, with equities at all-time highs and oil above $100 a barrel, may not be an anomaly. It may instead be the macro regime Shvets describes and Lee diagnoses functioning as intended.

In this environment, a risk premium is being embedded into rate curves, causing heightened volatility. Meanwhile, corporate borrowers have been good stewards in aggregate and have not been the source of debt growth. Corporate debt to GDP has been declining since COVID and is flat to 2000 levels. Therefore, it should not be surprising that spreads on corporate debt remain "tight." Corporations in aggregate have been better creditors than sovereigns.

Duration carries heightened risk as directed capital flows intensify rate volatility. The 10-year treasury bond's standard deviation of daily price for the past five years has been 50 bps, compared to Investment Grade corporates with 38 bps and High Yield with 29 bps. This highlights that rates have been a source of volatility while credit has been a suppressor of overall volatility.

‍

High Yield

High Yield returned a strong +1.70% during the month, bringing year-to-date performance to +1.14%. Lower quality lead the way, with CCCs up +2.76% in the month, but still lagging year-to-date up +0.49%. BBs underperformed to benchmark, up +1.47%, due to more rate sensitivity. Year-to-date BBs are up +1.08%. Single-Bs posted a solid +1.81%, bringing their year-to-date performance to +1.43%. Industry returns were tight to the average, with Autos outperforming up +2.23%, and Cable bringing up the rear at +0.47%. Yields ended at 7.02%, down 4 2bps in April and higher by 44bps from the start of the year. Spreads ended the month at 302 bps, a decrease of 47 bps from the beginning of the month and higher by 6 bps from the start of the year. Flows helped returns, with +$5bn in April compared to -$10bn in outflows for the first quarter. HY posted the strongest month in net issuance since April 2020, with $27.4bn net issuance and $44bn gross issuance. Fundamentals remain strong, with high-yield companies beating expectations by a 2.5-to-1 margin.

‍

Loans & CLOs

Loans were up +1.23%, underperforming HY but outperforming duration assets. Single-Bs led Loans higher, with a gain of +1.32%, while BBs were up +1.00% and CCCs lagged +0.26%. Year-to-date, CCCs are underperforming, down -3.95%, while Single-Bs are up +0.90% and BBs are up +1.65%. We continue to remain underweight CCCs, which has paid off in terms of return and volatility in the past few years. Loan industries traded in a similarly tight band to high yield, with media outperforming at 2.11% and manufacturing lagging at 0.65%. Technology, the dominant story year-to-date, returned 0.68% but remained down 3.50% on the year. Loans ended April with a three-year yield of 8.56%, down 14bps in the month and up from 7.86% to start the year or 70bps higher. Three-year discount margins were 488bps, down 26bps in the month and 33bps higher than at the start of the year.

In late March, two Harvard professors, Mark Roe and Vasile Rotaru, published a paper titled "Liability Management's Limited Runway: Corporate Restructuring Today." The paper assess the current state of Liability Management Exercises or LMEs. The takeaway is that evidence shows equity owners and board of directors may face liability if they attempt to enhance their own optionality during stressed periods without materially solving excessive leverage. Their dataset of 89 coercive, non-pro-rata LMEs shows the bankruptcy-avoidance narrative does not hold up. Within one year, fewer than half of LME firms avoid both bankruptcy and re-default; within two years, only 22% avoid both. The three-year "success" rate is 7%. Prepackaged bankruptcies achieved with similar creditor support relapse far less often.

With non-pro-rata LME's, aggregate debt levels do not decline. Prepackaged bankruptcies reduce leverage by 57% compared to LMEs at 0%. Instead of debt-to-equity swaps, LMEs typically elevate large or favored creditors, leaving thin equity cushions and distorted incentives. Credit ratings stay essentially flat for two years post LME. Post LME bankruptcies, when they happen, last 2x-3x longer than non-LME prepacks because the engineered capital structure complexity and creditor infighting complicate the process. We hope that papers such as this will begin to influence corporate behavior. If boards pursue LMEs that are expected to be operationally useless but preserve sponsor option value, that could implicate fiduciary duties to maximize firm value, particularly once insolvency is established.

This is a meaningful point because Gheewalla (the 2007 Delaware Supreme Court decision) is what extends fiduciary duties to creditors when a company is actually insolvent, not merely in the "zone of insolvency." Once insolvency is established, creditors gain derivative standing to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty. The Roe/Rotaru data, 7% three-year success rate, 0% median deleveraging, 71% three-year bankruptcy rate, is exactly the kind of empirical record that makes it harder for a board to argue an LME was a good-faith effort to preserve firm value rather than sponsor option value.

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Returns as of April 30, 2026

BH Strategy Returns Month QTD 1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Year Since Inception
High Yield Composite Gross 2.10% 2.10% 9.81% 9.98% 5.68% 6.80% 6.66%
High Yield Composite Net 2.06% 2.06% 9.29% 9.46% 5.18% 6.29% 6.16%
Bank Loan Composite Gross 1.41% 1.41% 8.24% 9.55% 7.33% -- 6.54%
Bank Loan Composite Net 1.37% 1.37% 7.71% 9.01% 6.80% -- 6.01%
Asset Class Month QTD YTD Index
HY Return1.70%1.70%1.14%ICE BAML HY Index
HY BB Return1.47%1.47%1.08%ICE BAML BB HY Index
HY B Return1.81%1.81%1.43%ICE BAML B HY Index
HY CCC Return2.76%2.76%0.49%ICE BAML CCC HY Index
Leveraged Loan Return1.23%1.23%0.75%S&P UBS Leveraged Loan Index
LL BB Return1.00%1.00%1.65%S&P UBS Leveraged Loan BB Index
LL B Return1.32%1.32%0.90%S&P UBS Leveraged Loan B Index
LL CCC Return0.26%0.26%-3.95%S&P UBS Leveraged Loan CCC Index
HYG1.52%1.52%1.16%Ishares Iboxx High Yield
BKLN1.35%1.35%0.06%Invesco Senior Loan ETF
S&P 500 Return10.49%10.49%5.70%S&P 500
Russell 2000 Return12.21%12.21%13.21%Russell 2000 Index
10yr Beg4.32%4.32%4.17%10yr Treasury
10yr End4.37%4.37%4.37%10yr Treasury
10yr Return-0.21%-0.21%-0.31%10yr Treasury
Beg Mo Beg QTD Beg Year End of Month
HY YTW7.44%7.44%6.62%7.02%
HY BB YTW6.25%6.25%5.55%5.97%
HY B YTW7.77%7.77%6.78%7.28%
HY CCC YTW13.95%13.95%12.57%13.14%
HY STW349 bps349 bps296 bps302 bps
HY BB STW229 bps229 bps186 bps195 bps
HY B STW386 bps386 bps315 bps332 bps
HY CCC STW1004 bps1004 bps892 bps918 bps
LL YT3Y8.70%8.70%7.86%8.56%
LL BB YT3Y6.31%6.31%5.79%6.21%
LL B YT3Y8.34%8.34%7.42%8.18%
LL CCC YT3Y20.41%20.41%17.95%20.58%
LL ST3Y514 bps514 bps455 bps488 bps
LL BB ST3Y275 bps275 bps247 bps253 bps
LL B ST3Y477 bps477 bps410 bps451 bps
LL CCC ST3Y1689 bps1689 bps1471 bps1691 bps

Source: Barrow Hanley. Returns represent an asset-weighted composite of all Bank Loan Fixed Income portfolios or High Yield Fixed Income portfolios. Index returns are shown before transaction costs, management fees, and other expenses. Performance is expressed in U.S. currency. Net-of-fee returns are calculated using a model fee. The model fee is based on a $100 million portfolio using our standard fee schedule. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Inception Date for Bank Loans is June 1, 2018. Inception Date for High Yield is January 1, 2005.

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