July was a big month for the administration. The passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill (“OBBB”) was a big win for the administration. Capital expenditure and R&D expensing, other infrastructure investments, and lower tax rates could provide a decent boost to growth. Companies are already highlighting benefits and raising cap-ex plans in their earnings calls. Risks include how these investments are financed. The administration was also able to strike a handful of trade agreements which will increase tariff revenues earned by the government, which are more likely to serve as taxes to US consumers, but on the margin encourage domestic production, given that notably in the trade agreements there are commitments from the counterparty countries to invest a significant amount of capital into the US. According to Piper Sandler’s Macroeconomics team, the US consumer is paying 31% of the tariffs currently, with importers paying 58% and exporters covering 11%. With tariffs going higher on August 1st, we’ll have to see how this split potentially changes.
Within financial markets, performance was a little bit more benign than political accomplishments. Equity markets were positive, with the S&P up 2.76% and small caps up 1.76%. Meanwhile, in fixed income, returns were steadily positive but not quite as exciting. 10-year rates rose, with the passage of the OBBB causing 10-year bond returns to decline -0.67%. Investment-grade corporates returned +0.15% as spreads tightened. High Yield generated a +0.40% return and Loans were up +0.82%.
In conversations with clients and prospects, passive investment options are often discussed. We looked at how passive investment options compared with index returns for large asset categories. Surprisingly, small caps – represented by the Russell 2000 – and investment grade corporates were the most efficient. We defined efficiency as how close the ETF returns were versus the index since inception. Not surprising to us is how inefficient High Yield and Loans are in a passive investment format. In both asset classes, the largest ETF underperformed the index by well over 100bps annually.
High Yield returned 0.40% for the month, just shy of coupon return as the average price declined 1/8th. Lower quality led in returns, with CCCs up 1.39%. Single-Bs were up 0.45% and BBs were up 0.17%. July was the busiest month since late 2021 with issuance of $37.5bn gross and $8bn net, bringing year-to- date issuance up to $183bn, with $135bn representing refinancings. Yields ended at 7.07%, which is 2bps higher than the start of the month, driven by higher Treasury rates and lower spreads. HY spreads compressed 15bps to 306bps. Demand was reasonable, with HY taking in $2bn of inflows and bringing year-to-date flows to $11.9bn.
Loans generated a solid 0.82% return, with Single-Bs significantly outperforming the rest of the market, up 0.86%. BBs were up 0.53% and CCCs were up 0.37%. The average loan price increased by $0.25 to $96.70 while the average coupon declined 2bps to end at 7.85%. Similar to HY, Loan issuance was very heavy with $202.4bn in gross issuance or
$14.2bn of issuance net of re-pricings. Year-to-date gross loan issuance has been $643bn, 82% of which has been re-pricing and refinancings. Loan yields increased slightly during the month. Loan demand has been strong, outpacing supply. Fund flows have seen $2.5bn in demand month-to-date and $4.7bn year-to-date, while CLOs have provided an additional $24bn in demand.
Lincoln International, an advisory provider for the private credit asset class, recently discussed a market update for distress, and it’s outpacing that of the High Yield and Broadly Syndicated Loan asset classes. Private credit is an opaque market, and the analysis is best done by advisors close to it who see a breadth of deals and their progression over time. The two best methods to
triangulate on a default rate are: 1) actual covenant default rates, which are different from payment defaults, and 2) the percentage of loans in the market that have paid their interest in additional principal versus cash interest (“PIK” for pay-in-kind), with some adjustments for borrower intent. Current data for covenant defaults show a 2.9% rate, which compares to the 4- year average of 3.2%. This only tells part of the picture, however. PIK features in Loans were either: 1) structured at the time of the original deal to permit flexibility for capital expenditure or other growth objectives, or 2) added at a later date to mitigate credit stress where borrowers were not able to pay the contractual cash interest due to lenders. The former was an expected feature and the latter was a direct result of credit stress and what would have been a payment default. 2021 was a strong year for private credit loan growth and ~7% of all loans had a PIK feature of any kind as of 4Q21. That compares to
~11% for 1Q25. However, ~35% of loans in 4Q21 were PIKing due to stress instead of being an initial feature of the loan, and today this figure sits at ~56%. That implies the default rate as a result of credit stress was 2% in 4Q21 and closer to 6% today. That compares with a 1.37% and 3.86% total default rate for HY and Loans, including distressed exchanges. For payment defaults alone, HY and Loans are only 0.40% and 1.19% respectively. We expect the divergence will continue whether due to economic weakness or elevated rates.
CLOs helped pull the Loans market ahead of other fixed income products. CLOs saw $24bn of new issuance compared to the
$14.2bn of new loan issuance. Gross CLO issuance was $53.9bn, including reset and re-pricings. Year-to-date gross CLO issuance has been $299.3bn and $119.6bn net of re- pricings and re-sets. CLO AAA and AA saw marginal tightening during the month, while Single-As through BBs were roughly flat. This divergence is likely due to AAA ETFs continuing to see solid inflows: more than $2bn in July.
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July was a big month for the administration. The passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill (“OBBB”) was a big win for the administration. Capital expenditure and R&D expensing, other infrastructure investments, and lower tax rates could provide a decent boost to growth. Companies are already highlighting benefits and raising cap-ex plans in their earnings calls. Risks include how these investments are financed. The administration was also able to strike a handful of trade agreements which will increase tariff revenues earned by the government, which are more likely to serve as taxes to US consumers, but on the margin encourage domestic production, given that notably in the trade agreements there are commitments from the counterparty countries to invest a significant amount of capital into the US. According to Piper Sandler’s Macroeconomics team, the US consumer is paying 31% of the tariffs currently, with importers paying 58% and exporters covering 11%. With tariffs going higher on August 1st, we’ll have to see how this split potentially changes.
Within financial markets, performance was a little bit more benign than political accomplishments. Equity markets were positive, with the S&P up 2.76% and small caps up 1.76%. Meanwhile, in fixed income, returns were steadily positive but not quite as exciting. 10-year rates rose, with the passage of the OBBB causing 10-year bond returns to decline -0.67%. Investment-grade corporates returned +0.15% as spreads tightened. High Yield generated a +0.40% return and Loans were up +0.82%.
In conversations with clients and prospects, passive investment options are often discussed. We looked at how passive investment options compared with index returns for large asset categories. Surprisingly, small caps – represented by the Russell 2000 – and investment grade corporates were the most efficient. We defined efficiency as how close the ETF returns were versus the index since inception. Not surprising to us is how inefficient High Yield and Loans are in a passive investment format. In both asset classes, the largest ETF underperformed the index by well over 100bps annually.
High Yield returned 0.40% for the month, just shy of coupon return as the average price declined 1/8th. Lower quality led in returns, with CCCs up 1.39%. Single-Bs were up 0.45% and BBs were up 0.17%. July was the busiest month since late 2021 with issuance of $37.5bn gross and $8bn net, bringing year-to- date issuance up to $183bn, with $135bn representing refinancings. Yields ended at 7.07%, which is 2bps higher than the start of the month, driven by higher Treasury rates and lower spreads. HY spreads compressed 15bps to 306bps. Demand was reasonable, with HY taking in $2bn of inflows and bringing year-to-date flows to $11.9bn.
Loans generated a solid 0.82% return, with Single-Bs significantly outperforming the rest of the market, up 0.86%. BBs were up 0.53% and CCCs were up 0.37%. The average loan price increased by $0.25 to $96.70 while the average coupon declined 2bps to end at 7.85%. Similar to HY, Loan issuance was very heavy with $202.4bn in gross issuance or
$14.2bn of issuance net of re-pricings. Year-to-date gross loan issuance has been $643bn, 82% of which has been re-pricing and refinancings. Loan yields increased slightly during the month. Loan demand has been strong, outpacing supply. Fund flows have seen $2.5bn in demand month-to-date and $4.7bn year-to-date, while CLOs have provided an additional $24bn in demand.
Lincoln International, an advisory provider for the private credit asset class, recently discussed a market update for distress, and it’s outpacing that of the High Yield and Broadly Syndicated Loan asset classes. Private credit is an opaque market, and the analysis is best done by advisors close to it who see a breadth of deals and their progression over time. The two best methods to
triangulate on a default rate are: 1) actual covenant default rates, which are different from payment defaults, and 2) the percentage of loans in the market that have paid their interest in additional principal versus cash interest (“PIK” for pay-in-kind), with some adjustments for borrower intent. Current data for covenant defaults show a 2.9% rate, which compares to the 4- year average of 3.2%. This only tells part of the picture, however. PIK features in Loans were either: 1) structured at the time of the original deal to permit flexibility for capital expenditure or other growth objectives, or 2) added at a later date to mitigate credit stress where borrowers were not able to pay the contractual cash interest due to lenders. The former was an expected feature and the latter was a direct result of credit stress and what would have been a payment default. 2021 was a strong year for private credit loan growth and ~7% of all loans had a PIK feature of any kind as of 4Q21. That compares to
~11% for 1Q25. However, ~35% of loans in 4Q21 were PIKing due to stress instead of being an initial feature of the loan, and today this figure sits at ~56%. That implies the default rate as a result of credit stress was 2% in 4Q21 and closer to 6% today. That compares with a 1.37% and 3.86% total default rate for HY and Loans, including distressed exchanges. For payment defaults alone, HY and Loans are only 0.40% and 1.19% respectively. We expect the divergence will continue whether due to economic weakness or elevated rates.
CLOs helped pull the Loans market ahead of other fixed income products. CLOs saw $24bn of new issuance compared to the
$14.2bn of new loan issuance. Gross CLO issuance was $53.9bn, including reset and re-pricings. Year-to-date gross CLO issuance has been $299.3bn and $119.6bn net of re- pricings and re-sets. CLO AAA and AA saw marginal tightening during the month, while Single-As through BBs were roughly flat. This divergence is likely due to AAA ETFs continuing to see solid inflows: more than $2bn in July.